基于交易记录特征的自私挖矿检测方案

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2023025

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

自私挖矿攻击是一种挖矿策略，存在基于工作量证明（PoW，proof of work）机制的区块链中。自私矿工通过延迟区块广播的时机来截取其他矿工的挖矿奖励，以此获得比正常情况下更多的收益。这种攻击对工作量证明机制的激励相容性造成了破坏。近年来，自私挖矿这一攻击行为被研究者从许多角度进行了研究和分析。然而这一挖矿策略利用了工作量证明机制区块链在网络延迟方面存在的缺陷，使得采用这一挖矿策略的矿工在行为上与正常挖矿行为没有明显的区别，导致当前缺少可以有效检测出自私挖矿行为的方案。因此，提出了一种自私挖矿的检测方案，该检测方案创新性地利用了区块链中区块的高度和区块中的交易记录特征，可以做到对网络中的自私挖矿行为进行实时检测，有一定的实用价值。所提检测方案为生成的新区块定义了一个状态值，这个状态值与区块中包含的交易数量、支付给矿工的交易费用等数据有关。根据这些特征值间的数学关系，可以判断出该区块是否来自自私矿工。通过仿真实验测试了攻击者在不同算力下，该检测方案的检测情况。结果表明，所提检测方案在判断区块是否来自自私挖矿时，有86.02%以上的检测准确率，可以有效地对自私挖矿产生的区块进行检测。

关键词: 区块链, 自私挖矿, 网络安全, 比特币

Abstract:

Selfish mining is an attack strategy in Proof-of-Work based blockchains, where attackers withhold their mined blocks to intercept the awards of other honest miners, resulting in higher profitability.This attack undermines the incentive compatibility of Proof-of-Work.Although there are various studies from researchers in recent years, there is no effective detection scheme as the vulnerability of blockchain in propagation delay makes it challenging to distinguish the attackers from honest miners.A scheme for selfish mining detection was introduced.In this scheme, a state value was assigned to the new block based on transaction amount and the transaction fee of the block.By analyzing the relationship between state value and transaction characteristics, we can determine if the block was mined by a selfish miner.The scheme is verified by an experiment with an accuracy of 86.02%.

Key words: blockchain, selfish mining, network security, bitcoin

中图分类号:

TP391

王贺立, 闫巧. 基于交易记录特征的自私挖矿检测方案[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2023, 9(2): 104-114.

Heli WANG, Qiao YAN. Selfish mining detection scheme based on the characters of transactions[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2023, 9(2): 104-114.

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字段	描述
区块哈希	本区块的哈希值
时间戳	生成本区块的时间戳
区块高度	本区块的区块高度
区块大小	本区块所占用的字节数
交易数量	本区块所包含的交易数量
交易哈希值	某条交易的哈希值
默克尔树根	本区块默克尔树根节点的哈希值
交易哈希值	某条交易的哈希值
交易所在区块	打包某条交易时的区块高度
交易记录大小	本交易所占用字节数
交易费用	完成本交易所支付给矿工的费用

符号	符号说明
n	被检测链中领先于当前公链的总区块数
A_j	被检测链中某个交易的字节大小
A_n	被检测链中的总交易字节大小
p_i	第i个被检测区块中的总交易数
q	正常区块中的总交易数
H_h	正常区块的高度
H_si	被检测区块的相对高度
	被检测区块交易的期望区块高度
	正常区块中交易的期望区块高度
ST_h	正常链的状态值
ST_si	被检测链的状态值，i=1,2,...,n