基于博弈论的网络空间安全若干问题分析

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2015.00006

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

信息安全经济学是信息安全的一个重要研究领域，博弈论是研究信息安全经济学的主要基础理论和工具之一。基于博弈论对网络空间安全的主要问题进行了分析，其中包括网络攻防、密码协议设计和安全技术配置。对于网络安全攻防，重点分析了攻防双方的对抗状况和防守方之间的互相依赖；对于密码协议设计，重点分析了博弈论在秘密共享和安全多方计算当中的应用；对于安全技术配置，重点分析了博弈论在入侵检测系统和防火墙技术中的应用。最后指出了当前研究存在的不足和信息安全经济学未来的研究方向。

关键词: 网络空间安全, 博弈论, 密码学

Abstract:

Information security economics is an important research area and game theory is one of the main basic theories and tools of cyberspace security.Based on game theory,the main problems of cyberspace securing were analyzed which including network attack and defense,cryptographic protocol design,and security technology con-figuration.The conflicts between attackers and defenders as well as the dependence among defenders were mainly analyzed on network and defense.Game theory’s applications in secret sharing and secure multi-party computation were emphasized on cryptographic protocol design.The game theory’s applications in intrusion detection system and firewall technology were analyzed on security technology configuration.Finally,the limitations of current re-searches and carries on the forecast to the future research directions were pointed out.

Key words: cyberspace security, game theory, cryptography

中图分类号:

TP309

朱建明,王秦. 基于博弈论的网络空间安全若干问题分析[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2015, 1(1): 43-49.

Jian-ming ZHU,Qin WANG. Analysis of cyberspace security based on game theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2015, 1(1): 43-49.

图/表 5

表1

表2

表3

图1

表4

防火墙规则选取博弈模型"

			管理员
		不公开规则 $(S_{d}^{ϕ})$	真实规则 $(S_{d}^{F})$	虚假规则 $(S_{d}^{T})$
攻击者	攻击 $(S_{a}^{f})$	$[μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{ϕ}), μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{ϕ})]$	$[μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{T}), μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{T})]$	$[μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{F}), μ (S_{a}^{f}, S_{d}^{F})]$
	不攻击 $(S_{a}^{ϕ})$	$[μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{ϕ}), μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{ϕ})]$	$[μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{T}), μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{T})]$	$[μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{F}), μ (S_{a}^{ϕ}, S_{d}^{F})]$

表4

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博弈类型	描述	参考文献
共同努力安全博弈	系统的防御水平取决于个体贡献之和	7,8,9,10,11]
最弱环安全博弈	系统的防御水平取决于防御水平最低的个体	7,8,9,10
最佳防御安全博弈	系统的防御水平取决于防御水平最高的个体	7,8,9,11]
最弱目标安全博弈	攻击者只对防御水平最低的个体进行攻击	8]

	参与者2投资	参与者2不投资
参与者1投资	(Y-c,Y-c)	(Y-c-qL,Y-pL)
参与者1不投资	(Y-pL,Y-c-qL)	{Y-[pL+(1-p)qL],Y-[pL+(1-p)qL]}

	安全多方计算	博弈论
动机	在模型之外	博弈支付
参与方	完全诚实或恶意	理性
解决方案	安全协议	均衡
隐私	目标	工具
提前结束	可能	不会