信息增值机制下在线医疗隐私保护策略

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2022072

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

近年来我国经济水平和人民生活水平飞速发展，医疗水平和医疗技术相继取得了突破。随着“互联网+”对各大领域商业模式创新的不断推动和深化，“互联网+”医疗发展得到了快速推动。机器学习、数据挖掘等数据处理技术不断发展，在线医疗过程中用户个人医疗隐私数据泄露风险引起了广大研究者的关注。考虑信息的可推断性，采用贴现机制以描述博弈不同阶段间用户隐私信息价值的变化；结合在线医疗隐私保护动机领域研究现状，通过博弈分析以从隐私保护动机层面探究如何调动博弈双方主体的积极性。针对用户有强意愿继续使用在线医疗平台、间断性提供隐私的博弈特征，采用重复博弈方法以更好地刻画用户与在线医疗平台之间的博弈过程。得出博弈双方主体的倾向变化规律，分析不同模型参数条件下博弈模型的混合策略纳什均衡及随着博弈阶段的进行双方博弈策略的变化趋势，给出当参数满足 2(c_p-c_n)≥l_p(p_n-p_p)时，用户开始由选择“同意共享隐私数据”转为选择“拒绝共享隐私数据”的重复博弈阶段，并通过仿真实验对上述结论进行了验证。基于以上结论，分别从在线医疗平台视角和用户视角，针对在线医疗过程中如何从博弈双方隐私保护动机层面实现隐私保护给出了可行的政策性建议。

关键词: 在线医疗, 隐私保护, 重复博弈, 信息增值, 纳什均衡

Abstract:

China’s economic level and people’s living standards have developed rapidly in recent years, and the medical level and medical technology have made breakthroughs continuously.With the promotion and deepening of“Internet Plus” to business model innovation in various fields, the development of “Internet Plus” medical has been rapidly developed.Due to the continuous development of data processing technologies such as machine learning and data mining, the risk of users’ personal medical data disclosure in the process of online medical treatment has also attracted the attention of researchers.Considering the deductibility of information, the discount mechanism was adopted to describe the change of user’s private information value in different stages of the game.Combined with the current research status in the field of online medical privacy protection motivation, how to mobilize the enthusiasm of both players from the level of privacy protection motivation was explored with game analysis.In view of the game characteristics of users’ strong willingness to continually use the online medical platform and intermittently provide privacy, the repeated game method was adopted to better describe the game process between users and the online medical platform.The tendency change law of the players on both sides of the game was obtained.Moreover, the Nash equilibrium of the game model was analyzed under different model parameters and the change trend of the game strategy of both sides with the progress of the game stage.When the parameters were met 2(c_p-c_n)≥l_p(p_n-p_p), the user started to choose from “agree to share private data” to “refuse to share private data”.The above conclusion was verified by simulation experiments.Based on the above conclusions, from the perspective of online medical platform and users, policy suggestions on how to realize privacy protection from the level of privacy protection motivation in the process of online medical treatment were given.

Key words: online medical, privacy protection, repeated game, information value-added, Nash equilibrium

中图分类号:

TP393

明盛智, 朱建明, 隋智源, 张娴. 信息增值机制下在线医疗隐私保护策略[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2022, 8(6): 169-177.

Shengzhi MING, Jianming ZHU, Zhiyuan SUI, Xian ZHANG. Online medical privacy protection strategy under information value-added mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2022, 8(6): 169-177.

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参数	含义
i_u	单次博弈中用户选择“同意共享隐私数据”的服务收益
I_u	本阶段博弈发生前，用户享有的总服务收益
i_p	单次博弈中在线医疗平台提供服务后得到的固定报酬
λ	在线医疗平台的收益与用户享有的总服务收益的比例系数
l_u	单次博弈中发生个人隐私泄露时用户的损失
l_p	单次博弈中发生个人隐私泄露时平台的损失
L_u	本阶段博弈发生前，发生个人隐私泄露对用户的总损失
L_p	本阶段博弈发生前，发生个人隐私泄露对平台的总损失
p_p	当在线医疗平台选择“积极保护隐私数据”时，发生个人隐私泄露的概率
p_n	当在线医疗平台选择“消极保护隐私数据”时，发生个人隐私泄露的概率，0＜ p_p＜p_n
c_p	单次博弈中在线医疗平台选择“积极保护隐私数据”时需付出的成本
c_n	单次博弈中在线医疗平台选择“消极保护隐私数据”时需付出的成本，0＜c_n＜c_p
α	用户选择“同意共享隐私数据”时，对今后服务收益的贴现率
β	用户选择“同意共享隐私数据”时，对今后用户隐私泄露损失的贴现率
ζ	用户选择“同意共享隐私数据”时，对今后平台隐私泄露损失的贴现率
x_i	在第i次博弈中，在线医疗平台选择“积极保护隐私数据”的概率
y_i	在第i次博弈中，用户选择“同意共享隐私数据”的概率