基于智能电网的安全密钥共享算法

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2021081

网络与信息安全学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 7 ›› Issue (4): 141-146.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2021081

• 专栏Ⅱ：密码技术与应用 • 上一篇下一篇

基于智能电网的安全密钥共享算法

顾伟¹, 沈剑², 任勇军¹

¹ 南京信息工程大学计算机与软件学院，江苏南京 210044
² 南京信息工程大学研究生院，江苏南京 210044

修回日期:2021-06-10 出版日期:2021-08-15 发布日期:2021-08-01
作者简介:顾伟（1983− ），男，江苏靖江人，南京信息工程大学高级实验师，主要研究方向为模式识别、人工智能、数据挖掘、信息安全
沈剑（1985− ），男，江苏南京人，博士，南京信息工程大学教授、博士生导师，主要研究方向为密码学、公钥密码学、数据安全
任勇军（1974− ），男，河北承德人，博士，南京信息工程大学副教授，主要研究方向为信息安全和区块链
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金(61922045);国家自然科学基金(62072249)

Secure key-sharing algorithm based on smart grid

Wei GU¹, Jian SHEN², Yongjun REN¹

¹ School of Computer and Software, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China
² Graduate School, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China

Revised:2021-06-10 Online:2021-08-15 Published:2021-08-01
Supported by:
TheNational Natural Science Foundation of China for Excellent Young Scholars(61922045);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(62072249)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对多数密钥建立协议存在中间参数泄露和私钥泄露问题，提出新的公钥共享的对称加密（PKS-SE）算法，进而维护智能电表与服务商间通信的安全。PKS-SE 算法以双线性映射、超奇异曲线为基础，构建智能电表与服务商通信的通信密钥，避免密钥托管问题。同时，PKS-SE算法减少了认证过程中交互的消息数，进而控制了PKS-SE算法的通信成本和运算成本。仿真结果表明，所提PKS-SE算法有效地实现了公钥共享。

关键词: 智能电网安全, 密钥建立, 密钥托管, 通信成本, 运算成本

Abstract:

Most of establishment-key protocols suffer from both session-specific temporary information attack and private key leakage issue.Therefore, a novel public key sharing-based symmetric encryption algorithm (PKS-SE) was proposed, in order to maintain the security of communication between smart meter and service providers.Based on bilinear mapping and super-singular curve, PKS-SE algorithm constructed the communication key between intelligent electricity meter and service provider, in order to avoid the key escrow problem.At the same time, PKS-SE algorithm reduced the number of required messages during the mutual authentication to only two messages, thus controlling the communication cost and operation cost of PKS-SE algorithm.Simulation results show that the proposed PKS-SE algorithm can effectively realize public key-sharing

Key words: smart grid security,, key establishment, key escrow, communication cost, computation cost

中图分类号:

TP183

顾伟, 沈剑, 任勇军. 基于智能电网的安全密钥共享算法[J]. 网络与信息安全学报, 2021, 7(4): 141-146.

Wei GU, Jian SHEN, Yongjun REN. Secure key-sharing algorithm based on smart grid[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2021, 7(4): 141-146.

图/表 7

图1

图2

图3

表1

各算法的通信成本Table 1 Communication cost of each algorithm"

算法	消息	通信成本/bit
SKDA	${C_{1}, C_{2}}, {R_{1}, R_{2}}, {C_{3}}$	3520
PSAK	${T_{1}, C_{1}, A_{1}}, {g_{1}, A_{2}}, {A_{3}}$	3840
LAKD	${A}, {B, R_{s p_{j}}, β_{s p_{j}}}, {φ_{S M_{i}}}$	1760
PKS-SE	${C_{1}, T_{i}, A_{i}, C T_{i}}, {A_{j}, V_{j}, C T_{j}}$	2528

表1

表2

表3

表4

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操作	运算时间/s
	0.032713
Hash函数	0.000006
在G₁的点乘	0.013405
在G₁的加法	0.000056
在G₂的乘法	0.000008
在G₂的指数运算	0.002249
一个ECC点乘	0.003350
一个ECC点加	0.000014

算法	执行时间/s	总执行时间/s
SKAD	SM：0.056　SP：0.108	0.164
PSAK	SM：0.043　SP：0.095	0.138
LAKD	SM：0.013　SP：0.020	0.033
PKS-SE	SM：0.043　SP：0.046	0.089

算法	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7
SKAD	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
PSAK	√	√	√	√	√	×	√
LAKD	√	√	√	√	√	×	×
PKS-SE	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
注：√表示满足；×表示不满足

基于智能电网的安全密钥共享算法

Secure key-sharing algorithm based on smart grid

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