ContractGuard：面向以太坊区块链智能合约的入侵检测系统

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2020025

Abstract

Abstract:

Ethereum smart contracts are programs that can be collectively executed by a network of mutually untrusted nodes.Smart contracts handle and transfer assets of values,offering strong incentives for malicious attacks.Intrusion attacks are a popular type of malicious attacks.ContractGuard,the first intrusion detection system (IDS) was proposed to defend Ethereum smart contracts against such attacks.Like IDSs for conventional programs,ContractGuard detects intrusion attempts as abnormal control flow.However,existing IDS techniques or tools are inapplicable to Ethereum smart contracts due to Ethereum’s decentralized nature and its highly restrictive execution environment.To address these issues,ContractGuard was designed by embedding it in the contracts.At runtime,ContractGuard protects the smart contract by monitoring the context-tagged acyclic path of the smart contract.As ContractGuard involves deployment overhead and deployment overhead.It was optimized under the Ethereum Gas-oriented performance model to reduce the overheads.The experimental results show that this work can effectively detect 83% of vulnerabilities,ContractGuard only adds to 36.14% of the deployment overhead and 28.27% of the runtime overhead.

Key words: blockchain, Ethereum smart contract, intrusion detection system, anomaly detection

CLC Number:

TP393

Gansen ZHAO,Zhijian XIE,Xinming WANG,Jiahao HE,Chengzhi ZHANG,Chengchuang LIN,ZHOU Ziheng,Bingchuan CHEN,RONG Chunming. ContractGuard:defend Ethereum smart contract with embedded intrusion detection[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2020, 6(2): 35-55.

Figures/Tables 15

项目	漏洞以及其攻击向量	代码大小/Byte	部署额外开销		运行额外开销		平均召回率	平均误报次数
项目	漏洞以及其攻击向量	代码大小/Byte	$\frac{部署额外开销}{原始部署开销}$	平均开销	$\frac{运行额外开销}{原始运行开销}$	平均开销	平均召回率	平均误报次数
DAO	可重入漏洞^[44]	1 774	11.95%	35 751.43	20.51%	43 845.47	100%	4.48
MultiSig	危险的Delegatecall^[45]	764	29.58%	22 679.66	28.27%	29 085.6	100%	2.0
KoETH	对外部调用的检查^[46]	3 617	31.18%	37 359.64	23.82%	44 067.72	100%	13.57
BecToken	算术上溢^[47]	5 963	9.52%	39 846.26	15.75%	68 371.95	100%	8.2
OwlWallet	Tx.Origin^[48]	561	27.27%	25 032.01	26.50%	31 456.74	100%	3.0
MerdeToken	算术下溢^[49]	1 013	21.03%	35 990.97	18.74%	42 397.30	100%	4.0

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漏洞	是否存在异常控制流
1) 可重入漏洞	是，此路径重新进入调用的函数中，然后发起外部调用
2) 危险的Deleagate call	是，此路径通过delegate call调用未知的库代码
3) 算术上溢/下溢	是，在拓展后的控制流图中，用于检查上下溢的分支会返回true
4) 默认类型	是，这条路径调用了本应该为 internal 属性的函数
5) 随机种子	否
6) 对外部调用的检查	是，在拓展后的控制流图中，用于检测call()和send()返回结果的值为false
7) 打包交易顺序	否
8) Tx.Origin	是，此路径由合约用户在攻击者合约中发起交易，然后触发Tx.Origin进行权限更改
9) 拒绝服务	是，此路径使智能合约失效
10) 短地址攻击	否
11) 逻辑错误	不一定存在，取决于安全路径与不安全路径是否进行了重合

项目	代码大小/Byte	Truffle框架下的测试用例	人工植入漏洞的总数	主要植入的漏洞	部署额外开销	运行额外开销	平均召回率	平均错误警报
Cryptokitties^[50]	30 966	516	64(14,7,3,40)	5(2,1,0,2)	14.28%	9.03%	60%	1.5
StatusNetwork^[51]	38 631	261	83(28,9,6,40)	2(0,1,1,0)	19.02%	15.79%	100%	3.0
VotingDApp^[52]	2 326	14	15(6,2,0,7)	2(2,0,0,0)	12.33%	10.84%	100%	1.0
pool-shark^[53]	5 895	69	33(8,6,1,18)	3(2,1,0,0)	10.23%	31.52%	100%	5.9

嵌入点	部署开销/Gas	运行开销/Gas
合约构造点	16 000	500～5 980
函数入口	4 200	45
分支点	2 600	30
回边	5 200	57
内部函数调用	4 400	48
内部函数返回	6 200	68
外部调用不安全合约	5 000	5 348
外部调用安全合约	6800	70
函数出口	800	9
路径集检查	1 600·n + 2 800	378

ContractGuard:defend Ethereum smart contract with embedded intrusion detection

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