移动通信网鉴权认证综述

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2018096

Abstract

Abstract:

With the increasingly serious security situation of mobile communication network,it becomes an important issue about how to protect the privacy of legitimate users while providing high-quality communication services,and how to protect the carrier network from being invaded becomes an important issue in the field of mobile communication security.Authentication is an important means for users and networks to authenticate each other's legitimacy.Authentication methods are also evolving along with network evolution.Starting with the authentication methods of past mobile communication networks (GSM,CDMA,UMTS,LTE),the advantages and disadvantages of each generation of authentication technology are analysed,along with which the authentication technology and unified authentication technology of the fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication to be commercialized are emphatically analysed.In the last,reasonable prospect for the development of authentication technology in the future are proposed.

Key words: mobile network, authentication, security, 5G mobile communication, unified authentication

CLC Number:

TN929

Xinxin HU, Caixia LIU, Shuxin LIU, Wei YOU, Kang QIAO. Overview of mobile communication network authentication[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2018, 4(12): 1-15.

Figures/Tables 10

References 57

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网络	元组	鉴权方向	优缺点
GSM	（SRES(i)，RAND，Kc(i)）	单向	具备一定的安全机制，三元组使用后会被破坏，不会重用，使用了A3、A8等算法加密，操作简单。单向鉴权，kc只有64 bit，存在明文发送IMSI情况
CDMA	（MIN，ESN，A-KEY，SSD-A，SSD-B）	单向	主密钥A-KEY不直接用于认证，2个SSD共128 bit。单向鉴权，操作复杂，存在明文发送IMSI情况
UMTS	（RAND，XRES，CK，IK，AUTN）	双向	提供接入链路的信令数据完整性保护，密钥长度为64/128 bit，安全机制可拓展，双向鉴权避免伪基站，鉴权向量不可重用。存在明文发送IMSI情况
LTE	（RAND，AUTN，XRES，Kasme）	双向	分级密钥增强安全性，密钥长度 128 bit，双向鉴权避免伪基站。存在明文发送IMSI情况
5G	（RAND、AUTN、XRES*、K_AUSF）	双向	部分密钥长度为128/256 bit，采用公私钥的方式加密SUPI不会明文发送SUPI。加密算法复杂，增加UE功耗，可能会增大时延

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