HIGHT算法的积分攻击

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2016135

通信学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (7): 71-78.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2016135

HIGHT算法的积分攻击

郭建胜^1,²,崔竞一¹,潘志舒³,刘翼鹏¹

¹ 解放军信息工程大学三院，河南郑州 450001
² 信息保障技术重点实验室，北京 100072
³ 西安卫星测控中心，陕西西安 710043

出版日期:2016-07-25 发布日期:2016-07-28
基金资助:
中国博士后科学基金资助项目

Integral attack on HIGHT block cipher

Jian-sheng GUO^1,²,Jing-yi CUI¹,Zhi-shu PAN³,Yi-peng LIU¹

¹ The Third Department, The PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
² Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory, Beijing 100072, China
³ Xi'an Satellite Control Center, Xi'an 710043, China

Online:2016-07-25 Published:2016-07-28
Supported by:
China Postdoctoral Science Foundation

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

对轻量级分组密码算法 HIGHT 在积分攻击方法下的安全性进行了研究。首先纠正了现有研究成果在构造区分器时的不当之处，重新构造了HIGHT算法的11轮积分区分器，并构造了相应高阶积分扩展下的17轮区分器；其次利用所构造的17轮区分器，结合“时空折中”原理对25轮HIGHT算法进行了积分攻击；最后对攻击算法的复杂度进行了分析，攻击算法需要的数据复杂度为2^62.92，时间复杂度为2^66.20，空间复杂度为2¹¹⁹。分析结果表明，所给出的攻击算法的攻击轮数和时间复杂度要优于现有研究结果。

关键词: 密码分析, 分组密码, 积分攻击, HIGHT算法

Abstract:

The security of HIGHT block cipher under integral attack was studied. Firstly, the flaw in the existing results on building the distinguisher was corrected. And a new 11-round integral distinguisher of HIGHT was built. Based on this new distinguisher, a 17-round multiple-integral distinguisher was built. By using the 17-round distinguisher, 25-round in-tegral attack on HIGHT was proposed based on the principle of time memory trade-off, with the data, time and memory complexity of 2^62.92, 2^66.20and 2¹¹⁹respectively. The results show that the attack was better than results before on the number of round and time complexity.

Key words: cryptanalysis, bock cipher, integral attack, HIGHT block cipher

郭建胜,崔竞一,潘志舒,刘翼鹏. HIGHT算法的积分攻击[J]. 通信学报, 2016, 37(7): 71-78.

Jian-sheng GUO,Jing-yi CUI,Zhi-shu PAN,Yi-peng LIU. Integral attack on HIGHT block cipher[J]. Journal on Communications, 2016, 37(7): 71-78.

图/表 6

图1

图2

图3

图4

表1

算法1所猜密钥与主密钥的关系"

wk₇	wk₆	wk₅	wk₄	sk₇₃	sk₇₇	sk₈₀	sk₈₁	sk₈₄	sk₈₅	sk₈₈	sk₈₉
MK₃	MK₂	MK₁	MK₀	MK₁₃	MK₉	MK₃	MK₄	MK₇	MK₀	MK₁₁	MK₁₂
sk₉₁	sk₉₂	sk₉₃	sk₉₅	sk₉₆	sk₉₇	sk₉₈	sk₉₉	$s k_{69}^{(0)}$	$s k_{76}^{(0)}$	$s k_{87}^{(0)}$	$s k_{94}^{(0)}$
MK₁₄	MK₁₅	MK₈	MK₁₀	MK₂	MK₃	MK₄	MK₅	$M K_{1}^{(0)}$	$M K_{8}^{(0)}$	$M K_{2}^{(0)}$	$M K_{9}^{(0)}$

表1

表2

参考文献 14

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HIGHT算法的积分攻击

Integral attack on HIGHT block cipher

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积分攻击来源	攻击轮数	数据复杂度	时间复杂度	空间复杂度
文献[2]	22	2^62.04	2^118.71	2⁶⁴（存储候选密钥）
本文	25	2^62.92	2^66.20	2¹¹⁹