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对轻量级密码算法MIBS的相关密钥不可能差分攻击

陈 平,廖福成,卫宏儒   

  1. 北京科技大学 数理学院,北京 100083
  • 出版日期:2014-02-25 发布日期:2014-02-15
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(61174209, 61272476);内蒙古自治区科技创新引导奖励基金资助项目(2012)

Related-key impossible differential attack on a lightweight block cipher MIBS

  • Online:2014-02-25 Published:2014-02-15

摘要: 研究了轻量级分组密码算法MIBS抵抗相关密钥不可能差分的能力。利用MIBS-80密钥编排算法的性质,给出了一个密钥差分特征,并结合特殊明密文对的选取,构造了一个10轮不可能差分。在此不可能差分特征上进行扩展,对14轮的MIBS-80进行了攻击,并给出了复杂度分析。此攻击的结果需要的数据复杂度为254和时间复杂度为256。

Abstract: The strength of MIBS algorithm against the related-key impossible differential attack was examined. MIBS is a lightweight block cipher algorithm. By using the key-expanding properties of MIBS-80 algorithm, a related-key differential feature was presented and a 10-round impossible differential method was constructed by combining special cipher-plaintexts. Based on the impossible differential method, an attack to 14-round MIBS-80 algorithm was given, and the attack complexity both on data and on time were gained. Analysis results indicate the attack to MIBS of 14 rounds MIBS-80 algorithm needs 254 chosen plaintext operations and 256 encrypting computations.

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