通信学报
• 学术通信 • 上一篇 下一篇
郑雅菲,卫宏儒
出版日期:
发布日期:
基金资助:
Online:
Published:
摘要: 对轻量级分组密码TWIS的安全性做进一步分析,将三子集中间相遇攻击应用于忽略后期白化过程的10轮TWIS。基于TWIS密钥生成策略中存在的缺陷,即其实际密钥长度仅为62 bit且初始密钥混淆速度慢,攻击恢复10轮TWIS全部62 bit密钥的计算复杂度为245,数据复杂度达到最低,仅为一个已知明密文对。分析结果表明TWIS在三子集中间相遇攻击下是不安全的。
Abstract: To do further analysis of the security of lightweight block cipher TWIS, 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack was applied to 10-round TWIS without the final whitening. Based on the weakness in the key schedule of TWIS:its actual key size was only 62-bit and the confusion speed of the initial key was rather slow, the time complexity to recover the whole 62-bit key of 10-round TWIS was 245, and the data complexity was low enough with only one known plaintext-ciphertext pair. The result shows that block cipher TWIS is not secure under 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack.
郑雅菲,卫宏儒. 分组密码TWIS的三子集中间相遇攻击[J]. 通信学报.
0 / / 推荐
导出引用管理器 EndNote|Reference Manager|ProCite|BibTeX|RefWorks
链接本文: https://www.infocomm-journal.com/txxb/CN/
https://www.infocomm-journal.com/txxb/CN/Y2014/V35/I6/23