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分组密码TWIS的三子集中间相遇攻击

郑雅菲,卫宏儒   

  1. 北京科技大学 数理学院,北京 100083
  • 出版日期:2014-06-25 发布日期:2014-06-15
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(61272476);内蒙古自治区科技创新引导奖励资金基金资助项目(2012)

3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack on block cipher TWIS

  • Online:2014-06-25 Published:2014-06-15

摘要: 对轻量级分组密码TWIS的安全性做进一步分析,将三子集中间相遇攻击应用于忽略后期白化过程的10轮TWIS。基于TWIS密钥生成策略中存在的缺陷,即其实际密钥长度仅为62 bit且初始密钥混淆速度慢,攻击恢复10轮TWIS全部62 bit密钥的计算复杂度为245,数据复杂度达到最低,仅为一个已知明密文对。分析结果表明TWIS在三子集中间相遇攻击下是不安全的。

Abstract: To do further analysis of the security of lightweight block cipher TWIS, 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack was applied to 10-round TWIS without the final whitening. Based on the weakness in the key schedule of TWIS:its actual key size was only 62-bit and the confusion speed of the initial key was rather slow, the time complexity to recover the whole 62-bit key of 10-round TWIS was 245, and the data complexity was low enough with only one known plaintext-ciphertext pair. The result shows that block cipher TWIS is not secure under 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack.

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