通信学报 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 54-61.doi: 3969/j.issn.1000-436x.2014.01.007

• 学术论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于系统动力学的网络安全攻防演化博弈模型

朱建明1,宋彪2,黄启发1()   

  1. 1 中央财经大学 信息学院,北京 100081
    2 内蒙古财经大学 会计学院,内蒙古 呼和浩特 010051
  • 出版日期:2014-01-25 发布日期:2017-06-17
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目;宁夏高等学校科学研究基金资助项目;中央财经大学基金资助项目

Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics

Jian-ming ZHU1,Biao SONG2,Qi-fa HUANG1()   

  1. 1 School of Information,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China
    2 School of Account,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot 010051,China
  • Online:2014-01-25 Published:2017-06-17
  • Supported by:
    The National Natural Science Foundation of China;Ningxia College Scientific Research Project;The Central University of Finance and Economics Party Building and Political Work Theory Research Project

摘要:

基于非合作演化博弈理论,提出了在攻防双方信息不对称情况下具有学习机制的攻防演化博弈模型。结合攻防效用函数,对非合作演化博弈攻防过程中的纳什均衡点的存在性和唯一性进行论证。用系统动力学建立演化博弈模型进行仿真,仿真结果表明引入第三方动态惩罚策略的演化博弈模型存在纳什均衡,指出在网络安全技术进步的同时,发展攻击者追踪技术,增强网络攻击行为可审查性,实现动态惩罚,是解决网络安全问题的重要途径。

关键词: 网络安全, 博弈, 系统动力学, 动态惩罚

Abstract:

An offense-defense game model with learning mechanism in the case of asymmetric information was proposed based on non-cooperation evolution game theory.Combined with utility function,the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the offense-defense process were proved.Simulation by system dynamics shows that there is Nash equilibrium in evolutionary game model after introducing the dynamic penalty strategy of the third party.Therefore,when improving all kinds of security technology,promoting attacker tracing technology,enhancing the censorship of network attack behaviors and dynamic penalty are fundamental ways to information security.

Key words: information security, game, system dynamics, dynamic penalty

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