基于博弈论的无线传感器网络恶意程序传播模型

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2018252

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

恶意程序传播是无线传感器网络（wireless sensor network，WSN）面临的一类重要安全问题。从博弈论的角度对WSN恶意程序传播的微观机理进行分析，建立了WSN的攻防博弈模型，求出了博弈模型的混合纳什均衡解，并根据博弈双方的混合纳什均衡策略确定恶意程序的传染概率，从而建立了WSN的恶意程序传播模型。通过使用元胞自动机方法对WSN的恶意程序传播过程进行模拟，揭示了恶意程序的传播速度与博弈参数之间的关系，研究结果对抑制WSN恶意程序传播具有理论指导意义。

关键词: 无线传感器网络, 恶意程序传播, 攻防博弈, 元胞自动机

Abstract:

Malware propagation is an important security problem faced by wireless sensor network (WSN).From the perspective of game theory,the microscopic mechanism of malware propagationin WSN was analyzed.The attack-defense game model of WSN was built,and the mixed Nash equilibrium solution of the model was obtained.With the solution,the infection probability of malware was determined and the theoretical model for the malware propagation in WSN was established.Meanwhile,a cellular automata model was proposed to simulate malware propagation process in WSN.Simulation experiments reveal the relationship between the propagation speed and the game parameters.The results of this study are of significance for people to formulate measures to reduce the propagation speed of malware.

Key words: wireless sensor network, malware propagation, attack-defense game, cellular automation

中图分类号:

TP393

周海平,沈士根,黄龙军,冯晟. 基于博弈论的无线传感器网络恶意程序传播模型[J]. 电信科学, 2018, 34(11): 67-76.

Haiping ZHOU,Shigen SHEN,Longjun HUANG,Sheng FENG. Game theory-based malware propagation model for wireless sensor network[J]. Telecommunications Science, 2018, 34(11): 67-76.

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符号	含义
a	合法节点检测到恶意程序获得的收益，恶意节点被识别造成的损失
b	恶意节点攻击成功带来的收益，合法节点感染恶意程序造成的损失
e_S	合法节点对收到的信息进行检测所需的能量代价
e_I	恶意节点发送恶意程序或正常信息所消耗的能量代价
x	恶意节点进行攻击的概率
y	合法节点进行检测的概率
Eu _S	合法节点在攻防博弈中的期望收益
Eu _I	恶意节点在攻防博弈中的期望收益

合法节点		恶意节点
合法节点	攻击		不攻击
检测	a-e _S ,-a-e _I		-e _S ,-e _I
不检测	- b,b-e _I		0,-e_I