通信学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (Z1): 168-173.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2016263

• 学术论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

对2个属性基签名方案安全性的分析和改进

杨骁1,向广利1,魏江宏2,3,孙瑞宗1   

  1. 1 武汉理工大学计算机科学与技术学院,湖北 武汉 430070
    2 解放军信息工程大学,河南 郑州 450001
    3 数字工程与先进计算国家重点实验室,河南 郑州 450001
  • 出版日期:2016-10-25 发布日期:2017-01-17

Security analysis and improvement of two attribute-based signature schemes

Xiao YANG1,Guang-li XIANG1,Jiang-hong WEI2,3,Rui-zong SUN1   

  1. 1 School of Computer Science and Technology,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China
    2 PLA Information Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450001,China
    3 Stake Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing,Zhengzhou 450001,China
  • Online:2016-10-25 Published:2017-01-17

摘要:

为了克服已有属性基签名机制在安全性、效率和签名策略上的缺陷,Ma等和Cao等分别提出了一个单属性机构环境下的门限属性基签名体制和多属性机构环境下签名策略支持属性的与、或、门限操作的属性基签名体制,并在计算性Diffie-Hellman假设下给出了相应体制的安全性证明。通过给出具体的攻击方法,指出这2个属性基签名方案都是不安全的,均不能抵抗伪造攻击,无法在实际中应用。此外,分析了这2个方案不安全的原因,并给出了针对Ma等方案的一种改进措施。

关键词: 属性基签名, 安全性分析, 伪造攻击

Abstract:

In order to overcome the drawbacks of current attribute-based signature (ABS) schemes in terms of security,efficiency and signing policy,Ma,et al.and Cao,et al.respectively proposed a threshold ABS with single attribute au-thority and a multi-authority ABS with signing policy supporting AND,OR,threshold gates,and presented the security proof of their schemes under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.Both schemes were demonstrated have security pitfalls by presenting specified attacks against them.Specifically,their schemes are all vulnerable to forgery attack.Thus,they are not feasible for practical applications.In addition,the cause of the flaws in these ABS schemes are presented,as well as an improvement of Ma et al.'s scheme.

Key words: attribute-based signature, security analysis, forgeable attack

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