通用可组合框架下的公平理性委托计算

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126

通信学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9): 106-119.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126

通用可组合框架下的公平理性委托计算

田有亮¹^,²^,³, 蒋小霞¹^,²^,³

¹ 贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院，贵州贵阳 550025
² 贵州大学省部共建公共大数据国家重点实验室（筹），贵州贵阳 550025
³ 贵州大学密码学与数据安全研究所，贵州贵阳 550025

修回日期:2021-03-29 出版日期:2021-09-25 发布日期:2021-09-01
作者简介:田有亮（1982− ），男，贵州盘县人，博士，贵州大学教授，主要研究方向为博弈论、密码学与安全协议
蒋小霞（1997− ），女，贵州遵义人，贵州大学硕士生，主要研究方向为通用可组合安全、理性委托计算
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(U1836205);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61662009);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61772008);贵州省科技计划基金资助项目(20183001);贵州省科技计划基金资助项目([2019]1098);贵州省科技计划基金资助项目([2020]6008);贵州省科技计划基金资助项目([2013]09);贵阳市科技计划基金资助项目([2021]1-5)

Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework

Youliang TIAN¹^,²^,³, Xiaoxia JIANG¹^,²^,³

¹ College of Computer Science and Technology, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
² State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
³ Institute of Cryptography ＆Data Security, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China

Revised:2021-03-29 Online:2021-09-25 Published:2021-09-01
Supported by:
The National Natural Science Foundation of China(U1836205);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61662009);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61772008);The Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province(20183001);The Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2019]1098);The Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2020]6008);The Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2013]09);Science and Technology Program of Guiyang([2021]1-5)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为实现理性委托计算中的经济与信誉公平性，基于密码学的区块链模型提出了通用可组合（UC）框架下的公平理性委托计算方案。首先，结合直接信誉和间接信誉构建关于委托方与计算方的双向信誉激励模型。其次，基于博弈论构建具有完美信息的理性委托计算动态博弈模型，分析得到唯一子博弈纳什均衡。再次，根据理性委托计算场景中的可验证性安全需求、参与者理性决策需求、经济与信誉公平需求以及敌手模型，基于通用可组合理论提出公平理性委托计算理想函数。最后，结合简洁承诺证明和智能合约提出了可安全实现理想函数的公平理性委托计算协议。协议分析证明，所提协议满足UC安全性。

关键词: 公平理性委托计算, 通用可组合框架, 智能合约, 密码学的区块链模型

Abstract:

To realize the economic and reputation fairness in rational delegation of computation, a fair and rational delegation of computation scheme based on blockchain model of cryptography in the universally composable (UC) framework was proposed.Firstly, a bidirectional reputation incentive model between the delegator and the calculator was presented by combining direct reputation and indirect reputation.Secondly, a dynamic game model with perfect information for fair and rational delegation of computation was constructed based on game theory, and a unique sub-game Nash equilibrium was further obtained.In addition, by analyzing the requirements for verifiability, rational decision of players, economic and reputation fairness, as well as adversary model, the ideal functionality for fair and rational delegation of computation was proposed.Finally, a fair and rational delegation of computation protocol by combining succinct commit-and-prove and smart contract was proposed to securely realize the ideal functionality.The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol satisfies UC security.

Key words: fair and rational delegation of computation, universally composable framework, smart contract, blockchain model of cryptography

中图分类号:

TN92

田有亮, 蒋小霞. 通用可组合框架下的公平理性委托计算[J]. 通信学报, 2021, 42(9): 106-119.

Youliang TIAN, Xiaoxia JIANG. Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework[J]. Journal on Communications, 2021, 42(9): 106-119.

图/表 5

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参考文献 28

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参数	含义
w _ij	委托方D_i向计算方W_j支付的委托费用
d_i	委托方D_i提交的押金
d_j	计算方W_j提交的押金
c_i	委托方D_i的验证成本
c_j	计算方W_j的计算成本
f_i	委托方D_i的收益
h_j	计算方W_j支付的仲裁费用

终端节点/参与者	W_j	D_i
v₁	w_ij-c_j	f _i-w_ij-c_i
v₂	d_i-c _j-h_j	f _i-d_i-c_i
v₃	-c _j	f_i-c_i
v₄	w _ij	-w_ij-c _i
v₅	-h_j-d _j	d _j-c_i
v₆	-d _j	d _j-c_i

方案	公开可验证性	经济公平性	信誉公平性	博弈模型	UC安全性
文献[8]方案	—	×	—	√	—
文献[9]方案	—	√	—	√	—
文献[10]方案	—	×	—	√	—
文献[13]方案	—	√	√	√	—
文献[17]方案	—	√	×	√	—
文献[22]方案	√	√	—	×	—
本文方案	√	√	√	√	√

通用可组合框架下的公平理性委托计算

Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework

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