基于攻防信号博弈模型的防御策略选取方法

doi:11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2016092

Abstract

Abstract:

Currently defense policies selection based on game theory mostly applied either the complete information game model or the static game model.In order to be more in line with the reality of network attack and defense,at-tack-defense behavior was studied by dynamic rivalry and incomplete information.The attack-defense signaling game mode was built,the method to quantify policies was improved and an algorithm to obtain the perfect Bayesian equili-brium was proposed.On the basis of analyzing equilibrium,the algorithm for selecting the optimal defense policy was proposed.The simulation experiment demonstrates that the model and algorithms are feasible and effective.By the expe-rimental data,general rules on signaling attack-defense game are summarized,which can guide defenders of different types to make decisions.

Key words: dynamic game, incomplete information, attack-defense signaling game, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, equi-librium analysis, policy selection

Heng-wei ZHANG,Ding-kun YU,Ji-hong HAN,Jin-dong WANG,Tao LI. Defense policies selection method based on attack-defense signaling game model[J]. Journal on Communications, 2016, 37(5): 51-61.

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References 23

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方法	信息需求	博弈类型	博弈者类型	发送信号	模型通用性	均衡求解	具体应用
文献[4]	完全信息	静态	1	—	差	简单	策略选取
文献[11]	不完全信息	静态	2	—	差	详细	效能评估
文献[12]	不完全信息	动态	3	攻击者	一般	简单	机制分析
文献[13]	不完全信息	动态	3	攻击者	一般	无	—
本文	不完全信息	动态	n	防御者	较好	详细	策略选取

原子攻击名称	分类	AL
a₁:remote buffer overflow	Root	10
a₂:install Trojan	Probe	3
a₃:steal account and crack it	User	5
a₄:send abnormal data to GIOP	Root	10
a₅:LPC to LSASS process	Probe	4
a₆:shutdown database server	Root	10
a₇:Oracle TNS listener	Root	10
a₈:Ftp rhost attack	User	5
a₉:Sr-Hard blood	Root	10

防御原子策略				防御者
		高防御等级				低防御等级
	d₁	d₂	d₃	d₄	d₅	d₆	d₇	d₈
limit packets from ports	v	v		v	v		v
install Oracle patches	v	v	v	v			v	v
reinstall listener program	v		v				v	v
uninstall delete Trojan		v		v
limit access to MDSYS.SDO_CS		v		v		v	v	v
renew data(root)	v		v	v	v
restart database server	v	v			v	v
limit SYN/ICMP packets		v	v	v			v	v
add physical resource	v					v	v
repair database	v	v	v		v	v	v
correct homepage			v	v				v
delete suspicious account	v	v	v	v			v
redeploy firewall rule and filtrate malicious packets		v		v		v	v
address blacklist	v		v		v	v		v
patch SSH on Ftp sever			v		v			v

名称	Ocost	Ncost	Rcost中e的取值
d₁	60	200	e₂=e₅=e₆=e₇=e₈=1,e₁=e₃=e₄=e₉=0
d₂	70	240	e₁=e₄=e₅=e₈=1,e₂=e₃=e₆=e₇=e₉=0
d₃	10	50	e₁=e₂=e₃=e₄=e₆=e₈=e₉=1,e₅=e₇=0
d₄	10	60	e₁=e₃=e₄=e₅=e₆=e₇=1,e₂=e₈=e₉=0
d₅	30	80	e₁=e₃=e₄=e₅=e₇=1,e₂=e₆=e₈=e₉=0
d₆	25	110	e₁=e₃=e₄=1,e₂=e₅=e₆=e₇=e₈=e₉=0
d₇	75	180	e₁=e₂=e₅=e₆=e₇=1,e₃=e₄=e₈=e₉=0
d₈	65	260	e₁=e₂=e₈=1,e₃=e₄=e₅=e₆=e₇=e₉=0

Defense policies selection method based on attack-defense signaling game model

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