基于差异度的密码芯片旁路攻击研究

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2015066

Abstract

Abstract:

Side channel attack (SCA) has the problems of high sample quantity and long analysis time. Noise of side channel leakage and its differential reduction method are researched combined with the architecture of micro control unit (MCU). Signal difference variability and hamming weight difference variability are defined, whose inverse proportion is checked. Method of key analysis based on difference variability is proposed, which uses its change property in encrypt process. Data encryption standard (DES) is cracked in experiment, which only needs 150 power tracks and 1.03 s analysis time. The attack method can be extended to crack other block ciphers which implemented in general purpose MCU.

Key words: cipher chip, side channel attack, noise analysis, difference variability, key analysis

Yang ZHANG,Kai-yan CHEN,Xiong-wei LI,Jun-guang CHEN,Yan LI. Side channel attack of cipher chips based on difference variability[J]. Journal on Communications, 2015, 36(3): 124-129.

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References 13

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差异组	差异度值
D(X₁,X₂)	-2
D(X₁,X₃)	-2
D(X₁,X₄)	-1
D(X₂,X₃)	0
D(X₂,X₄)	1
D(X₃,X₄)	1

组别	明文	E	D(X₁,X₂)	D(S₁,S₂)	密钥空间(0x)
1	0x0000000000000000	00	-2	1	05,12,18,21,24
1	0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF	3F	-2	1	05,12,18,21,24
2	0x0000000000000000	00	0	0	05,07,09,0B,…18,…24…
2	0x00FFFF0000FFFF00	0C	0	0	05,07,09,0B,…18,…24…
3	0x00FFFF0000FFFF00	0C	-2	1	05,18,24
3	0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF	3F	-2	1	05,18,24

对应S盒	密钥空间
1	05,18,24
2	13
3	04,08
4	08
5	05,09
6	32
7	27,2B
8	02,10

Side channel attack of cipher chips based on difference variability

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