基于激励相容的权益分散共识算法

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022232

Journal on Communications ›› 2022, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (12): 101-112.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022232

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Equity decentralized consensus algorithm based on incentive compatibility

Youliang TIAN¹^,²^,³^,⁴, Yansen YUAN¹^,²^,³^,⁴, Hongfeng GAO²^,³^,⁴, Yang YANG⁵, Jinbo XIONG⁶

¹ State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
² College of Computer Science and Technology, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
³ Institute of Cryptography ＆Date Security, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
⁴ Guizhou Province Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Block Chain Technology, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
⁵ School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065, Singapore
⁶ College of Computer and Cyber Security, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China

Revised:2022-11-08 Online:2022-12-25 Published:2022-12-01
Supported by:
The National Key Research and Development Program of China(2021YFB3101100);Key Program of the National Natural Science Union Foundation of China(U1836205);Project of High-level Innovative Talents of Guizhou Province([2020]6008);Science and Technology Program of Guiyang([2021]1-5);Science and Technology Program of Guiyang([2022]2-4);Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2020]5017);Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province([2022]065)

Abstract

Abstract:

The PoW consensus algorithm has been proved to be incentive incompatible, existing computing centralization under high reward differences and slow convergence of forks in extreme cases.Based on this, an incentive-compatiblebased consensus algorithm SSPoW was proposed.By introducing local solutions to calculate the computing power aggregated on the block chain, the explicit quantification of computing power was used to speed up the convergence of the fork, thus satisfying the consistency of the blockchain.Incentive compatibility was achieved by improving the reward scheme, which reduced the problem of computing centralization caused by high reward differences.Simulation results prove that the proposed algorithm could effectively reduce the reward differences and is more efficient than the traditional PoW consensus algorithm, which has positive implications for improving system security and consensus efficiency.

Key words: consensus algorithm, cooperative mining, fork convergence, rewarding scheme

CLC Number:

TP302

Youliang TIAN, Yansen YUAN, Hongfeng GAO, Yang YANG, Jinbo XIONG. Equity decentralized consensus algorithm based on incentive compatibility[J]. Journal on Communications, 2022, 43(12): 101-112.

Figures/Tables 8

References 24

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字段名	含义
Version	当前区块版本号，表示本区块遵守的验证规则
PreHash	前一个区块头的哈希值
Target	当前难度目标值，定义了寻找新区块的难度
Nonce	一个随机数，用于生成哈希值
Timestamp	一个Unix时间戳
MerkleRoot	Merkle树的根，汇总了该区块的所有交易
Coinbase	获得奖励的矿工的地址

Equity decentralized consensus algorithm based on incentive compatibility

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