通信学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (12): 37-46.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2015313

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基于拍卖的物联网搜索数据提供机制

殷丽华1,郭云川1,张会兵2   

  1. 1 中国科学院 信息工程研究所,100093
    2 桂林电子科技大学 广西可信软件重点实验室,广西 桂林 541004
  • 出版日期:2015-12-25 发布日期:2017-07-17
  • 基金资助:
    国家高技术研究发展计划(“863”计划)基金资助项目;中国科学院战略先导专项基金资助项目;广西省自然科学基金资助项目;广西省自然科学基金资助项目;广西高等学校高水平创新团队及卓越学者计划基金资助项目;桂林电子科技大学创新团队基金资助项目

Data provision for IoT searches:an auction approach

Li-hua YIN1,Yun-chuan GUO1,Hui-bing ZHANG2   

  1. 1 Institute of Information Engineering,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100093,China
    2 Guangxi Key Lab of Trusted Software,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,China
  • Online:2015-12-25 Published:2017-07-17
  • Supported by:
    The National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program);The Strategic Priority Research Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences;The Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi Province;The Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi Province;The High Level of Innovation Team of Colleges and Universities in Guangxi and Outstanding Scholars Program Funding;The Program for Innovative Research Team of Guilin University of Electronic Technology

摘要:

不同于互联网搜索采用爬虫等技术来采集数据,物联网搜索获取数据的主要方式之一是数据拥有者主动提供数据,然而自私性及隐私保护等原因导致数据拥有者不愿主动提供数据。这使得如何有效激励数据拥有者提供数据成为促进物联网搜索发展的关键问题之一。由于竞价拍卖能有效激励参与合作,因此将竞价博弈引入到物联网搜索中,为物联网搜索中的数据采集提供方法。具体地,提出了面向性价比最优的多属性逆向拍卖激励机制,证明了最优数据质量独立于自身报价、其他竞拍者的数据质量及其报价。

关键词: 物联网搜索, 数据采集, 博弈

Abstract:

Getting accurate data was one of keys problems in the IoTs search.Different from the Web searches that use the crawlers to collect data on the Internet,the IoT searches require that owners offer data proactively because their data were not simply released to the Internet.However,due to some reasons(privacy concerns),data owners were unwilling to provide their data to the IoT searches without enough incentives.As a result,effectively motivating owners to provided data becomes a key problem for he development of IoT searches.To address this problem,a multi-attribute auction that maximizes cost-effectiveness ratio was proposed.This mechanism can prevent hostile bids and avoid the problem that the winner provide data inconsistent with the promised quality.It was also proved that in the auction,the optimal quality was independent from its quotation and other bidders’ quality and their price.

Key words: IoT search, data provision, game