用于硬件木马检测的电磁辐射分析方法研究

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2021030

Abstract

Abstract:

With the globalization of the integrated circuit industry, hardware Trojan is becoming the main threat to integrated circuits.At present, the side-channel analysis which can make a good trade-off between detection ability and cost, has attracted more attention from the academia.The side-channel analysis method based on electromagnetic radiation is one of the hotspots in hardware security field.The ability evaluation of electromagnetic radiation analysis method to detect hardware Trojan was focused, and the factor that limited their detection performance was explored.The experimental results on FPGA show that the electromagnetic radiation analysis method can effectively detect hardware Trojan whose electromagnetic radiation distribution is significantly different from surrounding circuits, but it cannot be applied to hardware Trojan with complex frequency distribution of electromagnetic radiation.

Key words: detection ability evaluation, electromagnetic radiation, hardware Trojan detection, side-channel analysis

CLC Number:

TP393

Yongkang TANG, Xing HU, Ting SU, Shaoqing LI. Research on electromagnetic radiation based side-channel analysis method for hardware Trojan detection[J]. Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security, 2021, 7(2): 43-56.

Figures/Tables 15

References 31

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实验条件	信噪比/dB	实验条件	信噪比/dB	实验条件	信噪比/dB
电路块间距离远	-16.64	小波降噪	-14.34	HT Ⅳ	-10.70
电路块间距离远	-16.64	HT Ⅰ	0.94	HT Ⅴ	-11.06
电路块间距离近	-17.19	HT Ⅱ	2.19	HT Ⅵ	-9.47
电路块间距离近	-17.19	HT Ⅲ	1.84	HT Ⅶ	-10.76

Research on electromagnetic radiation based side-channel analysis method for hardware Trojan detection

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References 31

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