通用可组合框架下的公平理性委托计算

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126

Abstract

Abstract:

To realize the economic and reputation fairness in rational delegation of computation, a fair and rational delegation of computation scheme based on blockchain model of cryptography in the universally composable (UC) framework was proposed.Firstly, a bidirectional reputation incentive model between the delegator and the calculator was presented by combining direct reputation and indirect reputation.Secondly, a dynamic game model with perfect information for fair and rational delegation of computation was constructed based on game theory, and a unique sub-game Nash equilibrium was further obtained.In addition, by analyzing the requirements for verifiability, rational decision of players, economic and reputation fairness, as well as adversary model, the ideal functionality for fair and rational delegation of computation was proposed.Finally, a fair and rational delegation of computation protocol by combining succinct commit-and-prove and smart contract was proposed to securely realize the ideal functionality.The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol satisfies UC security.

Key words: fair and rational delegation of computation, universally composable framework, smart contract, blockchain model of cryptography

CLC Number:

TN92

Youliang TIAN, Xiaoxia JIANG. Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework[J]. Journal on Communications, 2021, 42(9): 106-119.

Figures/Tables 5

References 28

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参数	含义
w _ij	委托方D_i向计算方W_j支付的委托费用
d_i	委托方D_i提交的押金
d_j	计算方W_j提交的押金
c_i	委托方D_i的验证成本
c_j	计算方W_j的计算成本
f_i	委托方D_i的收益
h_j	计算方W_j支付的仲裁费用

终端节点/参与者	W_j	D_i
v₁	w_ij-c_j	f _i-w_ij-c_i
v₂	d_i-c _j-h_j	f _i-d_i-c_i
v₃	-c _j	f_i-c_i
v₄	w _ij	-w_ij-c _i
v₅	-h_j-d _j	d _j-c_i
v₆	-d _j	d _j-c_i

方案	公开可验证性	经济公平性	信誉公平性	博弈模型	UC安全性
文献[8]方案	—	×	—	√	—
文献[9]方案	—	√	—	√	—
文献[10]方案	—	×	—	√	—
文献[13]方案	—	√	√	√	—
文献[17]方案	—	√	×	√	—
文献[22]方案	√	√	—	×	—
本文方案	√	√	√	√	√

Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework

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