泛在网络环境下隐蔽通道关键技术研究综述

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022072

Abstract

Abstract:

In the ubiquitous network environment, covert channel bypasses the system’s security strategy to transmit covert information by modifying the system’s shared resources, which poses a serious security threat to the computer and network system.The researches on covert channel in ubiquitous network environment were summarized and analyzed from three aspects of measurement, construction and detection.First, the typical covert channel metrics including the capacity, robustness, anti-detection, regularity and shape were summarized.Second, the construction technologies of covert channel were summarized and analyzed from six aspects of resource sharing, capacity, robustness, anti-detection, advantages and disadvantages in the first time.Third, the detection technologies of covert channel were compared and analyzed from five aspects of the type of covert channel, accuracy, whether it can be blind detection, the advantages and disadvantages.Finally, the development trends of covert channel were summarized and future research directions were prospected.

Key words: ubiquitous network, covert channel measurement, covert channel construction, covert channel detection

CLC Number:

TP393

Fenghua LI, Chaoyang LI, Chao GUO, Zifu LI, Liang FANG, Yunchuan GUO. Survey on key technologies of covert channel in ubiquitous network environment[J]. Journal on Communications, 2022, 43(4): 186-201.

Figures/Tables 12

方法类别	构建方法	共享资源（通信环境）	容量	稳健性	抗检测性	优点	缺点
基于信息编解码	基于数据包顺序编解码^[23]	数据包（传统网络）	1.2 Mbit/s	强	弱	数据包合理排序可以实现大容量和低错误率的隐蔽传输	传输数据量越大越容易被检测，且开销大
	编解码SPRT传感器信号^[47]	SPRT传感器（物联网）	4 097.5～9 061.67 bit/s	强	—	隐蔽通道容量大，编/解码速度快	检测开销大
基于时间模式调节	基于包间时延^[10]	包间时延（传统网络）	—	较强	较强	稳健性较强，丢包率较低	没有充分研究隐蔽通道的容量
基于协议扩展填充	基于信息隐藏^[17]	MQTT协议（物联网）	1～1 048 560 Tbit/s	较强	较强	设计隐蔽通道种类较多，可扩展到其他类似协议中构建	当网络时延增加时，误码率会增加
基于恶意软件行为	基于用户行为^[49]	智能手机（移动通信网络）	1～1.67 bit/s	较强	较强	有较强的抗检测性	检测开销大
基于流媒体调制	调制蜂窝语音流^[20]	蜂窝语音流（移动通信网络）	13 bit/s	强	—	有较大的隐蔽容量且稳健性强	没有充分研究隐蔽通道的抗检测性
基于系统资源共享	基于硬件随机数生成器^[3]	硬件随机数生成器（操作系统）	7～200 kbit/s	强	—	隐蔽通道容量大、误差小，不易产生噪声	当木马和间谍进程同时执行时，隐蔽容量会减少
	基于分支预测器^[5]	分支预测器（操作系统）	—	较强	—	隐蔽通道容量大、稳健且抗噪声	没有充分研究隐蔽通道的抗检测性
	基于内存重复删除^[18]	内存（云环境）	1.24～90 bit/s	—	—	当系统工作量增加时，隐蔽通道容量下降不明显	选择构建隐蔽通道的内存越大，越容易被检测
	基于缓存^[56]	缓存（云环境）	34.27～45.09kbit/s	强	—	容量大且稳健性强，错误传输率极低，且有较强的抗噪性	通信端点设计不支持分组交换，不能同时拥有多个套接字
	基于内存总线^[58]	内存总线（云环境）	至少100 bit/s	较强	—	隐蔽通道容量大且可靠	由于内存访问的不确定性，使检测开销大；抗噪性较差，当噪声严重时，误码率会升高
	基于云实例硬盘争用^[60]	云实例（云环境）	0.1 bit/s	较强	较强	因不知隐蔽传输位何时启动，故有较强的抗检测性和稳健性	隐蔽容量较小，检测开销大，当云实例频繁访问硬盘时，误码率会升高
基于物理介质调节	调节磁信号^[21]	磁信号（Air-gap）	至多5 bit/s	较弱	—	当无线通信距离较近时有较大的传输速率，且误码率低	随着无线通信距离增大，误码率会增加

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构建方法类别	文献	隐蔽通道类型	应用环境	特点
基于信息编解码	文献[24,47,69]	存储隐蔽通道	物联网移动通信网络车载自组网	发送方对隐蔽信息进行编码，接收方对隐蔽信息同步解码，获取隐蔽信息，通常隐蔽容量的大小取决于编解码速度
基于时间模式调节	文献[46,69]	时间隐蔽通道	物联网车载自组网	通过调节数据包的发送时间模式传输隐蔽信息，如包间间隔、包间时延等，通常具有较强的抗检测性，不过噪声等干扰易对该类隐蔽通道造成影响
基于协议扩展填充	文献[17,36,45]	存储隐蔽通道	物联网移动通信网络	通过扩展协议、填充空余字段等来隐藏隐蔽信息，该方法具有可拓展性，一般可以构建多个隐蔽通道，但隐蔽容量受限于具体协议的填充字段
基于恶意软件行为	文献[48-49]	行为隐蔽通道	物联网移动通信网络	恶意软件基于系统漏洞、用户行为等特性或行为特征，传输隐蔽信息，通常具有较强的抗检测性
基于流媒体调制	文献[20,24,36,50]	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	移动通信网络	利用蜂窝语音流、视频流等流媒体作为通信载体，传输隐蔽信息，但是隐蔽通道容量往往较小
基于系统资源共享	文献[4,19,56-60]	存储隐蔽通道	云环境	通过共享或修改内存、缓存等系统资源实现隐蔽通信，通常能实现较大的隐蔽容量
基于物理介质调节	文献[21,64-65]	存储隐蔽通道	Air-gap系统	主要基于电磁信号、功率和温度等共享资源构建，往往隐蔽容量很小，且通信强度对距离存在较强的依赖性

检测方法	隐蔽通道类型	准确率	是否能盲检	形状指标	规律指标
K-S检验^[43]	Jitterbug	66%	是	√	―
	Jitterbug	86%	是	√	―
	TR-CTC-HTTP	67%	是	√	―
韦尔奇t检验^[43]	TR-CTC-SSH	56%	是	√	―
	MB-CTC-HTTP	92%	是	√	―
	MB-CTC-SSH	95%	是	√	―
	TR-CTC-HTTP	60%	是	―	―
规律性检测^[43]	TR-CTC-SSH	69%	是	―	―
	MB-CTC-HTTP	60%	是	―	―
	MB-CTC-SSH	91%	是	―	―

检测方法	召回率	精确率	准确率	F1指标
决策树^[74]	95.17%	96.01%	99.71%	—
支持向量机^[75]	97%	100%	98.5%	98.48%
神经网络^[77]	97.56%	96.75%	97%	97.15%
支持向量机^[78]	85%	88%	—	86%
KNN^[78]	96%	96%	—	96%
朴素贝叶斯^[78]	88%	89%	—	88%
Logistic回归^[78]	91%	91%	—	90%

检测方法	隐蔽通道类型	真阳率	假阳率	是否能盲检
基于K-L散度^[41]	存储隐蔽通道	100%	0	否
基于修正条件熵^[81]	时间隐蔽通道	100%	1%	是
基于修正条件熵^[83]	存储隐蔽通道	97%	1%	是
基于香农熵^[83]	存储隐蔽通道	85%	2%	是

检测方法	隐蔽通道类型	是否能盲检	优点	缺点
基于信息流图^[87]	存储隐蔽通道	是	可以完整表示系统的信息流，不需要额外改变参数	信息流图存在伪通信路径问题且检测开销较大
基于有向信息流图^[88]	操作系统隐蔽通道	是	该方法检测效率较高且适用于多个系统	当系统源代码量很大时，检测开销也会较大

Survey on key technologies of covert channel in ubiquitous network environment

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检测方法类别	隐蔽通道类型	特点
基于统计	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	主要通过统计隐蔽流量的规律性、形状特征或分析特殊字段的属性分布，以识别隐蔽通道
基于机器学习	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	主要通过挖掘隐蔽流量的特征，建立机器学习分类模型来发现隐蔽通道
基于信息论	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	主要基于熵理论来区分隐蔽流量和合法流量
基于信息流分析	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	主要通过分析系统中信息流属性来识别隐蔽通道
其他检测方法	时间隐蔽通道存储隐蔽通道	主要针对具体通信环境下共享资源的特性进行分析，以检测隐蔽通道

[1]	Xin JIAN,Xiao-ping ZENG,Yun-jian JIA,Jun-yi YANG,Yuan HE. Traffic modeling for machine type communication and its overload control [J]. Journal on Communications, 2013, 34(9): 123-131.
[2]	Su PAN,Qiang YE,Sheng-mei LIU. Equivalent spectral bandwidth concept in ubiquitous networks and applications in vertical handoff algorithms [J]. Journal on Communications, 2012, 33(3): 130-136.
[3]	Xiao-yu TONG,Yun-yong ZHANG,Lei XU. Intelligent ubiquitous network [J]. Journal on Communications, 2011, 32(7): 182-188.
[4]	Zong-liang GAN,Li-na QI,Gui-jin TANG,Xiu-chang ZHU. Wyner-Ziv spatial scalable video coding using compressive sensing in ubiquitous networks [J]. Journal on Communications, 2010, 31(11): 41-48.

方法类别	检测方法	隐蔽通道类型	准确率	是否能盲检	优点	缺点
基于统计	基于统计^[70]	存储隐蔽通道	100%	否	检测精度更高，假阳性率更低	需要较大的计算缓冲区，检测开销大
	基于机器学习^[74]	时间隐蔽通道	99.71%	否	检测精度较高，且适合于特征明显的数据集	当网络流量多样化，特征不明显时，检测效果不佳，且不具备盲检能力
基于机器学习	基于支持向量机^[75]	时间隐蔽通道	98.5%	是	通用检测框架具有盲检能力	对于网络抖动隐蔽通道的检测性能略差
	基于机器学习^[76]	存储隐蔽通道	99.92%	否	算法采用动态识别模型，对于新生成的恶意域名可以更新识别	模型动态调整自己的识别模型对网络特性和需求的影响，检测率可能会降低
基于信息论	基于部分熵^[80]	Jitterbug （时间隐蔽通道）	97.4%～100%	否	在网络抖动产生较高误码率的情况下也有较好的检测性能，在较短时间检测窗口下有较高的检测速度	不具备盲检能力
其他检测方法	基于可压缩修正分数^[89]	存储隐蔽通道	94.81%	否	检测精度较高	检测依赖于 PDU 的数目，当检测的 PDU 较少时，精度会降低，不具备盲检能力
	基于重放混淆^[95]	存储隐蔽通道	99.5%	否	检测方法覆盖率高，结果比较准确	抗噪性较差且检测开销大