基于路口V2P的避撞算法与验证

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2017276

电信科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 66-73.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2017276

基于路口V2P的避撞算法与验证

张家波,王超凡,李哲

重庆邮电大学通信与信息工程学院，重庆 400065

修回日期:2017-09-25 出版日期:2017-12-01 发布日期:2018-01-12
作者简介:张家波（1974-），男，重庆邮电大学通信与信息工程学院副教授、硕士生导师，主要研究方向为车联网通信技术、无线传输技术应用。|王超凡（1992-），男，重庆邮电大学通信与信息工程学院硕士生，主要研究方向为车联网通信技术。|李哲（1992-），男，重庆邮电大学通信与信息工程学院硕士生，主要研究方向为车联网通信技术。
基金资助:
四川省高校重点实验室开放资助项目(QXXCSYS201505);四川省高校重点实验室开放资助项目(QXXCSYS201606);国家重大科学仪器设备开发专项资助项目(2012YQ20022404);重庆邮电大学教学改革资助项目(XJG1301)

Collision avoidance algorithm and validation based on V2P at intersection

Jiabo ZHANG,Chaofan WANG,Zhe LI

School of Communication and Information Engineering,Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing 400065,China

Revised:2017-09-25 Online:2017-12-01 Published:2018-01-12
Supported by:
Opened Project of Key Lab of Sichuan(QXXCSYS201505);Opened Project of Key Lab of Sichuan(QXXCSYS201606);The National Key Scientific Instrument and Equipment Development Project of China(2012YQ20022404);Education Reform Project of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(XJG1301)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

近年来交通事故数量逐渐攀升，无信号灯路口的人车事故尤其严重。首先，基于行人、车辆在路口的穿插延误支付、碰撞风险支付，建立人车通行的博弈模型，给予双方合理的优先通行决策；进一步地，在此基础上引入驾驶员的交通奖罚支付，改进博弈模型，并通过实例进行对比分析，改进后的博弈模型增加了车辆的让行率，更有利于道路交通安全；此外，改进传统的病毒传播模型，分析交通参与者的违章心理，通过数值模拟仿真，证明了违章处罚的必要性。为今后过街行人与车辆避撞系统的开发提供了理论上的参考。

关键词: 交通安全, 支付, 博弈, 违章心理分析

Abstract:

Traffic accidents have risen in recent years,especially in the case of traffic accidents without signal intersection.A pedestrian and vehicle prevailing game model was established based on the delay and the risk payoff of the pedestrian and the vehicle at the intersection,which could give pedestrians and vehicles a reasonable priority prevailing decision.Moreover,an improved game model was established on the basis of the introduction of the driver’s reward and fine payoff.Practices proved that the improved model could increase the pass rate of pedestrian,which was more conducive to road traffic safety.In addition,the traditional virus transmission model was improved to analyze the psychology of traffic participants,which proved the necessity of illegal punishment by numerical simulation.The research provides a theoretical reference for the future development of pedestrian and vehicle collision avoidance system.

Key words: traffic safety, payoff, game, analysis of violation psychology

中图分类号:

TP311

张家波,王超凡,李哲. 基于路口V2P的避撞算法与验证[J]. 电信科学, 2017, 33(12): 66-73.

Jiabo ZHANG,Chaofan WANG,Zhe LI. Collision avoidance algorithm and validation based on V2P at intersection[J]. Telecommunications Science, 2017, 33(12): 66-73.

图/表 8

表1

表2

基于延误和风险的支付"

支付		驾驶员
支付		等待	通行
行人	等待	$(* ， *)$	$(α S_{p}^{} - β D_{v}^{}, - α S_{v}^{} + β D_{v}^{})$
	通行	$(- α S_{p}^{} + β D_{p}^{}, α S_{v}^{} - β D_{p}^{})$	$(- α S_{p}^{} + β D_{p}^{}, - α S_{v}^{} + β D_{v}^{})$

表2

表3

表4

图1

图2

图3

图4

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支付			驾驶员
			安全型		一般型		危险型
			等待	通行	等待	通行	等待	通行
行人	健壮者	等待	（,）	(-0.099,0.165 8)	（,）	(-0.007,0.085)	（,）	(0.084,0.004)
		通行	(-0.075,0.008 2)	(-0.075,0.165)	(-0.123,0.045 3)	(-0.123,0.085)	(-0.171,0.082)	(-0.171,0.004)
	其他	等待	（,）	(0.056,0.033)	（,）	(0.141,-0.038)	（,）	(0.225,-0.110)
		通行	(-0.018,-0.071)	(-0.018,0.033)	(-0.115,0.013 2)	(-0.115,-0.038)	(-0.213,0.097)	(-0.213,-0.110)

支付			驾驶员
			安全型		一般型		危险型
			等待	通行	等待	通行	等待	通行
行人	健壮者	等待	(,)	(-0.099,-0.058 7)	(,)	(-0.007,-0.085)	(,)	(0.084,-0.112)
		通行	(-0.075,0.142)	(-0.075,-0.058 7)	(-0.123,0.166)	(-0.123,-0.085)	(-0.171,0.192)	(-0.171,-0.112)
	其他	等待	(,)	(0.056,-0.109)	(,)	(0.141,-0.132)	(,)	(0.225,_-0.156)
		通行	(-0.018,0.064)	(-0.018,-0.109)	(-0.115,0.121)	(-0.115,-0.132)	(-0.213,0.177)	(-0.213,-0.156)

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基于路口V2P的避撞算法与验证

Collision avoidance algorithm and validation based on V2P at intersection

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