国际标准竞争背景下通信技术标准的开发和管制策略研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1000-0801.2014.05.015

Abstract

Abstract:

On the basis of economic interests and national security, the national economic security interests were put forward. And then a multi-stage dynamic game model was build to analyze how countries develop the new communication standard strategy and control measures, in order to protect the domestic technical standards, to maximize national security interests, when communication technology standard upgrade.

Key words: standard competition, technology development strategy, control policy, game theory

Chaofeng Xu,Zhanhong Xin. Research on Communication Technology Standard Development and Control Policy Under International Standard Competition[J]. Telecommunications Science, 2014, 30(5): 105-111.

Figures/Tables 11

阶段	n
第n阶段选择技术标准A的人数	$N_{n}^{A} = x_{n} N, (n > 0); N_{o}^{A} = N_{o}^{A}$
第n阶段选择技术标准B的人数	$N_{n}^{B} = (1 - x_{n}) N, (n > 0); N_{o}^{B} = N_{o}^{B}$
到本阶段累计选择技术标准A的人数	$P_{n}^{A} = \sum_{i = 1}^{n} N_{i}^{A} = (x_{1} + \dots + x_{n}) N + N_{o}^{A}$
到本阶段累计选择技术标准B的人数	$P_{n}^{B} = \sum_{i = 1}^{n} N_{i}^{B} = (n - x_{1} - \dots - x_{n}) N + N_{o}^{B}$
选择技术标准A的人数的比例	$x_{n} = h (\frac{U^{A}}{U^{A} + U^{B}}) = h (\frac{G^{A} + V (P_{n - 1}^{A})}{G^{A} + V (P_{n - 1}^{A}) + G^{B} + V (P_{n - 1}^{B})}), (n > 0)$
	$x_{o} = h (\frac{V (N_{o}^{A})}{V (N_{o}^{A}) + V (N_{o}^{B})})$

		A国政策
		管制	开放
B国政策	管制	$I^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} N + N_{o}^{A}) + k (P_{B}, d_{B})] \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$ $I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$	$I^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{A}) + k (P_{B}, d_{B})] \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$ $I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$
	开放	$I^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{A}) + k (P_{B}, d_{B})] \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$	$I^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} N + N_{o}^{A}) + k (P_{B}, d_{B})] \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$ $I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$
		$I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) \frac{N}{2}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$

		A国政策
		管制	开放
B国政策	管制	$I^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{2} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C (P_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$	$I^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{2} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$
		$I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$	$I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$
	开放	$I^{A} = f (X_{1}^{2} N + N_{o}^{A}) \times C (P_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$	$I^{A} = f (X_{1}^{2} N + N_{o}^{A}) \times C (B_{A}, P_{B}; d_{A}, d_{B})$
		$I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$	$I^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C (P_{B}, P_{A}; d_{B}, d_{A})$

			A国政策
		管制		开放
B国政策	管制	$I_{4}^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{1} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 1}^{2}$		$I_{4}^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{1} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 3}^{2}$
		$I_{4}^{B} = [f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) + k_{1}] \times C_{B 1}^{2}$		$I_{4}^{B} = [f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) + k_{3}] \times C_{B 3}^{2}$
	开放	$I_{4}^{A} = f (N X_{1}^{1} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 2}^{2}$		$I_{4}^{A} = f (N X_{1}^{1} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 4}^{2}$
		$I_{4}^{B} = [f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) + k_{2}] \times C_{B 2}^{2}$		$I_{4}^{B} = [f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) + k_{4}] \times C_{B 4}^{2}$

			A国政策
		管制		开放
B国政策	管制	$I_{3}^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{2} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 1}$		$I_{3}^{A} = [f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{1} + N_{o}^{A}) + k_{3}] \times C_{A 3}$
		$I_{3}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 1}$		$I_{3}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 3}$
	开放	$I_{3}^{A} = f (X_{1}^{2} N + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 2}$		$I_{3}^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} N + N_{o}^{A}) + k_{4}] \times C_{A 4}$
		$I_{3}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 2}$		$I_{3}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 4}$

			A国开发方向
		独立自主		追随兼容
B国政策	管制	$I_{2}^{A} = f (\frac{N}{2} X_{1}^{2} + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 1}$		无
		$I_{2}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{2}) \frac{N}{2} + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 1}$
	开放	$I_{2}^{A} = [f (X_{1}^{1} N + N_{o}^{A}) + k_{4}] \times C_{A 4}$		$I_{2}^{A} = f (X_{1}^{1} N + N_{o}^{A}) \times C_{A 4}^{2}$
		$I_{2}^{B} = f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) \times C_{B 4}$		$I_{2}^{B} = [f ((1 - X_{1}^{1}) N + N_{o}^{B}) + k_{4}] \times C_{B 4}^{2}$

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Research on Communication Technology Standard Development and Control Policy Under International Standard Competition

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2	骆品亮，殷华祥 . 标准竞争的主导性预期与联盟及福利效应分析．管理科学学报， 2009,12（6）: 1～10
3	胡武捷 . 中国信息通信产业技术标准竞争与策略研究．北京邮电大学博士学位论文， 2010