智能网联汽车网络安全浅析

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2020127

Abstract

Abstract:

The automotive industry is experiencing a shift to an intelligent and connected paradigm.(Semi-) Autonomous vehicles use a new generation of information and communication technologies to realize a full range of interactions between vehicles and cloud,vehicles and vehicles,vehicles and roads,and vehicles and pedestrian,etc.When cars started to become connected computers on wheels,network security became a major challenge,and because the scope of cyber threats extended from virtual space to physical space,the harm of cybersecurity had risen to human life.The electronic/electrical structure,in-vehicle network structure,and out-of-vehicle network structure of intelligent vehicles were introduced,the security requirements of vehicle networks were elaborated,several cyber-attacks against connected-automated vehicle (CAV) were pointed out,the available defense measures against these attacks were addressed.The advantages and disadvantages of these measures were summarized.Finally,possible defense measures and directions in the future were discussed to further ensure the security of CAV.

Key words: automated driving, internet of vehicles, intelligent connected-automated vehicle, cybersecurity

CLC Number:

TP302

Yufeng LI,Xiaoyuan LU,Chenhong CAO,Jiangtao LI,Hongyi ZHU,Nan MENG. A survey of cybersecurity for intelligent connected-automated vehicle[J]. Telecommunications Science, 2020, 36(4): 36-45.

Figures/Tables 5

References 41

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等级	名称（SAE）	SAE定义	驾驶操作	驾驶环境监控	后备支援	作用域（条件及环境）
L0	无自动化	人全权操作，完成所有DDT	人类	人类	人类	无
L1	驾驶支援	通过驾驶环境对方向盘或加减速中的一项提供驾驶支援，其他DDT都由人进行操作	人类和系统	人类	人类	部分
L2	部分自动化	通过驾驶环境对方向盘或加减速中的多项操作提供支援，其他DDT都由人进行操作	系统	人类	人类	部分
L3	条件自动化	在限定的 ODD 内自动完成所有的 DDT，根据系统请求人回应和干预	系统	系统	人类	部分
L4	高度自动化	在限定的 ODD 内自动完成所有 DDT，可以无须人类驾驶员介入	系统	系统	系统	部分
L5	完全自动化	在所有道路和环境下自动完成所有驾驶操作	系统	系统	系统	全域

攻击	属性	防御措施	参考文献
Sybil	身份认证、完整性	加密方案、身份确认方案和信誉机制	[17-18]
假冒攻击	身份认证、完整性	消息签名、身份验证等	[19-20]
密钥/证书复制攻击	身份认证、完整性	完善的密钥管理方案	[21-22]
欺骗攻击	身份认证、保密性	加密方案和身份验证	[23]
DoS/DDoS攻击	可用性、身份认证	身份验证方案和防火墙、入侵检测等方法	[25]
干扰攻击	可用性、完整性	设置冗余部件，多传感器数据融合	[26]
恶意软件	可用性、保密性	恶意软件检测和防火墙等	[27]
黑洞攻击	可用性、完整性	信誉机制、基于机器学习的恶意行为检测	[28]
延迟攻击	可用性、身份认证	经过身份验证的计时方法	[29]
伪造信息	完整性、可用性、身份认证	消息签名和基于信誉的方案	[18]
重放攻击	完整性、身份认证	使用序列号，时间戳和安全通信	[30]
伪装攻击	完整性、身份认证	恶意行为检测和身份验证	[31]
篡改攻击	完整性、可用性	签名并验证传输的消息	[29]
窃听攻击	机密性、身份认证	加密方案，网络隔离机制	[31-32]
拦截攻击	机密性、身份认证	加密方案、身份验证	[33]

未来方向	研究关注
功能安全和网络安全一体化	CAV全生命周期内的功能安全、网络安全一体化设计方法、分析方法
内生安全技术	通过内生安全构造技术，使汽车获得非特异性免疫能力，应对0-Day等未知网络威胁
CAV网络证书管理	证书管理系统的系统架构、模型和信任锚点等
测试技术	CAV网络安全如何构建体系化的网络安全测试床，并能实施有效的测试
区块链技术	区块链的CAV网络应用及网络安全增强
轻量级认证技术	满足CAV高速实时应用的轻量级快速认证技术
深度学习防御	保护智能车载系统各个方面（入侵检测、软件漏洞检测、恶意软件检测）的深度学习方法
云网融合的安全	云网融合背景下的CAV流式数据安全处理等
软件定义的安全	使用软件定义平台实现网络威胁检测和威胁缓解的自动化
5G智能网联汽车安全	引入5G技术后的CAV网络安全研究

A survey of cybersecurity for intelligent connected-automated vehicle

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