Telecommunications Science ›› 2023, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (12): 85-99.doi: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-0801.2023260

• Research and Development • Previous Articles    

Design of truthful and efficient auction mechanisms for feature-dimension-as-a-service in vertical federated learning

Zhongyi LAI, Zhengwei NI, Shaohan FENG   

  1. School of Information and Electronic Engineering, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
  • Revised:2023-12-10 Online:2023-12-01 Published:2023-12-01
  • Supported by:
    The National Natural Science Foundation of China(62302446);Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China(LQ22F010008)

Abstract:

The vertical federated learning (VFL) architecture was considered, and an auction mechanism using feature dimensions as resources was designed.The mechanism included a trusted third-party central control as the auctioneer and several task demanders as bidders.To prevent fraudulent bidding, the optimal feature-dimension-as-a-service (Optimal-FDaaS) based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism was introduced, and the auction winner was determined through integer linear programming.This mechanism maximized social benefits but had high computational complexity.To reduce this, greedy-feature-dimension-as-a-service (Greedy-FDaaS) was proposed.Both mechanisms ensured three properties: truthfulness, individual rationality, and efficiency.Finally, simulation analysis was provided to prove the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms.

Key words: vertical federated learning, auction game, resource allocation, FDaaS, truthfulness

CLC Number: 

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